Review rev_a3726e921a8946ba980e10d530cb9a6f
UserOfficiald7d85a95-49ea-818b-aa46-7dff97fe9263
Package
aws-lc-sys@0.41.0
Registry
crates.io
Package Hash
Files Reviewed
5
Agent
codex-gpt-5.4-mini-medium
Review Procedure
file-focused-review/v1
Created
2026-07-04
Severity
noneConfidence
highReviewed the ARM assembly implementation of `bignum_moddouble`, which performs a constant-time modular doubling routine over limb arrays and returns via the standard ABI. I checked the file for install hooks, network or exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, and other payload-bearing behavior, and found no concrete malicious or supply-chain indicators. Reviewed the ARM assembly implementation of `bignum_half_p521`, which performs a one-bit right rotation/halving modulo p_521 using register-level loads, shifts, and stores only. I found no concrete indicators of install-time execution, network or exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, or persistence in this target file. Reviewed this x86-64 assembly routine for hidden execution, install-time behavior, network/exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, and other supply-chain indicators. The file appears to be a normal bignum helper that counts leading zero words and contains only ABI/CFI glue plus a tight loop over the input buffer; no concrete malicious or suspicious behavior was present. Reviewed this internal C header, which only declares elliptic-curve hash-to-curve/hash-to-scalar APIs and an EC parameter parsing helper; it contains no install hooks, network or exfiltration code, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, or persistence behavior. The file appears to be a straightforward declaration header with security-relevant behavior limited to cryptographic API exposure, not hidden execution. Reviewed `aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn_assert_test.cc`, which contains GoogleTest coverage for `bn_assert_fits_in_bytes` across large, small, zero, and boundary BIGNUM inputs under non-debug/non-Android builds. I found no concrete indicators of install hooks, network or exfiltration behavior, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, or other supply-chain compromise patterns in this file.
{
"summary": "Reviewed the ARM assembly implementation of `bignum_moddouble`, which performs a constant-time modular doubling routine over limb arrays and returns via the standard ABI. I checked the file for install hooks, network or exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, and other payload-bearing behavior, and found no concrete malicious or supply-chain indicators.\nReviewed the ARM assembly implementation of `bignum_half_p521`, which performs a one-bit right rotation/halving modulo p_521 using register-level loads, shifts, and stores only. I found no concrete indicators of install-time execution, network or exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, or persistence in this target file.\nReviewed this x86-64 assembly routine for hidden execution, install-time behavior, network/exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, and other supply-chain indicators. The file appears to be a normal bignum helper that counts leading zero words and contains only ABI/CFI glue plus a tight loop over the input buffer; no concrete malicious or suspicious behavior was present.\nReviewed this internal C header, which only declares elliptic-curve hash-to-curve/hash-to-scalar APIs and an EC parameter parsing helper; it contains no install hooks, network or exfiltration code, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, or persistence behavior. The file appears to be a straightforward declaration header with security-relevant behavior limited to cryptographic API exposure, not hidden execution.\nReviewed `aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn_assert_test.cc`, which contains GoogleTest coverage for `bn_assert_fits_in_bytes` across large, small, zero, and boundary BIGNUM inputs under non-debug/non-Android builds. I found no concrete indicators of install hooks, network or exfiltration behavior, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, or other supply-chain compromise patterns in this file.",
"review_procedure": "file-focused-review/v1",
"public_user_id": "d7d85a95-49ea-818b-aa46-7dff97fe9263",
"agent": {
"name": "codex",
"model": "gpt-5.4-mini",
"reasoning_effort": "medium"
},
"files": [
{
"path": "aws-lc/third_party/s2n-bignum/s2n-bignum-imported/arm/generic/bignum_moddouble.S",
"hash": "blake3:06b6d5f2e8d569479b681c4e60a5c7ac1fa0dbe949930e8641b6b75a80379fa6",
"summary": "Reviewed the ARM assembly implementation of `bignum_moddouble`, which performs a constant-time modular doubling routine over limb arrays and returns via the standard ABI. I checked the file for install hooks, network or exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, and other payload-bearing behavior, and found no concrete malicious or supply-chain indicators.",
"severity": "none",
"confidence": "high"
},
{
"path": "aws-lc/third_party/s2n-bignum/s2n-bignum-imported/arm/p521/bignum_half_p521.S",
"hash": "blake3:c8426d3f1bfbb10653eba4465b0a14f88278a3d38b3d4b27dafd6f14b9ca636d",
"summary": "Reviewed the ARM assembly implementation of `bignum_half_p521`, which performs a one-bit right rotation/halving modulo p_521 using register-level loads, shifts, and stores only. I found no concrete indicators of install-time execution, network or exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, or persistence in this target file.",
"severity": "none",
"confidence": "high"
},
{
"path": "aws-lc/third_party/s2n-bignum/s2n-bignum-imported/x86_att/generic/bignum_cld.S",
"hash": "blake3:3931d5d95755a3edfcbf9ce41e976affe8b937b70c1227cc1f2747a94862186d",
"summary": "Reviewed this x86-64 assembly routine for hidden execution, install-time behavior, network/exfiltration, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, and other supply-chain indicators. The file appears to be a normal bignum helper that counts leading zero words and contains only ABI/CFI glue plus a tight loop over the input buffer; no concrete malicious or suspicious behavior was present.",
"severity": "none",
"confidence": "high"
},
{
"path": "aws-lc/crypto/ec_extra/internal.h",
"hash": "blake3:d5fa1d45e7ac68c05cbc9560c7aaa9979a9b75016e7dd545ca4bf4301ea64cbc",
"summary": "Reviewed this internal C header, which only declares elliptic-curve hash-to-curve/hash-to-scalar APIs and an EC parameter parsing helper; it contains no install hooks, network or exfiltration code, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, or persistence behavior. The file appears to be a straightforward declaration header with security-relevant behavior limited to cryptographic API exposure, not hidden execution.",
"severity": "none",
"confidence": "high"
},
{
"path": "aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn_assert_test.cc",
"hash": "blake3:9d54420fdc6aa615fddd5a7ebf542272581f3d9d7bf18d2b900d3edf831107e8",
"summary": "Reviewed `aws-lc/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn_assert_test.cc`, which contains GoogleTest coverage for `bn_assert_fits_in_bytes` across large, small, zero, and boundary BIGNUM inputs under non-debug/non-Android builds. I found no concrete indicators of install hooks, network or exfiltration behavior, credential access, dynamic code loading, obfuscation, persistence, or other supply-chain compromise patterns in this file.",
"severity": "none",
"confidence": "high"
}
]
}